Annotated bibliography - EU governance and institutional issues

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Article / book

Blom-Hansen, J. (2008). The origins of the EU comitology system: a case of informal agenda-setting by the commission. Journal of European Public Policy, 15(2), 208-226.

Hix, S. (2002). Constitutional Agenda-Setting Through Discretion and Rule Interpretation: Why the European Parliament Won at Amsterdam. British Journal of Political Science, 32(2), 259-280.

Kleine, M. (2007). Leadership in the European Convention. Journal of European Public Policy, 14(8), 1227-1248.



Levy, R., Barzelay, M. & Porras-Gomez, A. (2011). The reform of financial management in the European Commission: A public management cycle case study. Public Administration, 89(4), 1545-1467.

Pollack, M. (1999). Delegation, Agency and Agenda setting in the Treaty of Amsterdam. European Integration Online Papers, 3(6).


Tsebelis, G. & Proksch, S. (2007). The Art of Political Manipulation in the European Convention. Journal of Common Market Studies, 45(1), 157-186.

Description

Argues that European Commission was the key driver behind the establishment of the comitology system in the late 1950s and early 1960s. Abstract


Argues that the empowerment of the European Parliament in the Amsterdam Treaty came about because the EP was a "constitutional agenda-setter" in the procedure leading up to the treaty change. Abstract

Pursues the question to what extent the chairman of the European convention was able to influence the body's outcome with regard to the constitutional treaty, by distinguishing between the form and the substance of the decisions. Abstract

Discusses the policy cycle regarding the reform of internal financial control in the European Commission and explains the agenda-setting, alternative-specification, and decisional processes involved. Abstract


Based on a principal-agent approach to the Amsterdam Treaty, this article focuses on the delegation of powers to the EU level and the influence of EU institutions on agenda-setting. Abstract

Argues that the success of the European Convention in producing a Constitutional Treaty was possible because of the agenda control exercised by the Praesidium and in particular its President. Abstract