Annotated bibliography - Budgetary and macroeconomic policy

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Article / book

Aksoy, D. (2010). Who gets what, when, and how revisited: Voting and proposal powers in the allocation of the EU budget. European Union Politics, 11(2), 171-194.

Benedetto, G. (2013). The EU budget after Lisbon: rigidity and reduced spending?. Journal of Public Policy, 33(3), 345-369.

Bocquillon, P. & Dobbels, M. (2014). An elephant on the 13th floor of the Berlaymont? European Council and Commission relations in legislative agenda setting. Journal of European Public Policy, 21(1), 20-38.



Jabko, N. (1999). In the name of the Market: how the European Commission paved the way for monetary union. Journal of European Public Policy, 6(3), 475-495.

Description

Argues that the proposal-making power associated with the EU presidency helps a  member state to obtain financial benefits during negotiations over the EU budget. Abstract

Examines the effects of the changes in the Lisbon Treaty on the power of the EP over the EU annual budget and multiannual financial framework. Abstract

Looking into three cases – the energy climate package, economic governance
reform and Schengen reform - this article argues that patterns of interactions between the the European Council and the Commission in legislative agenda setting can be best described as ‘competitive cooperation’. Abstract

Discusses the two main facets of the Commission’s strategy of inducing key actors to re-articulate their preferences in terms of monetary union to achieve the advent of EMU. Abstract