Annotated bibliography - Conditional agenda-setting

The literature on conditional agenda-setting focuses on the ability of institutional actors to determine the content of formal proposals in EU decision-making. On the basis of George Tsebelis’ pioneering work in the second half of the 1990s, a specific literature has developed that analyses the dynamics and consequences of conditional agenda-setting. This literature uses game-theoretical approaches to analyse the effect of formal institutional frameworks on the ability of actors to operate as conditional agenda-setters. The literature on conditional agenda-setting uses the term ‘agenda-setting’ differently than most other studies in this bibliography, in the sense that it is not concerned with processes of attention allocation to issues but with the ability to influence formal proposals in decision-making procedures.

In addition to articles on conditional agenda-setting in a strict sense, this heading also contains articles that focus on formal decison-making procedures without specifically using the conditional agenda-setting framework as introduced by Tsebelis.

Menu

Article / book

Aksoy, D. (2010). Who gets what, when, and how revisited: Voting and proposal powers in the allocation of the EU budget. European Union Politics, 11(2), 171-194.

Belke, A. & Schnurbein, B. von (2012). European monetary policy and the ECB rotation model: Voting power of the core versus the periphery. Public Choice, 151(1), 289-323.

Benedetto, G. (2013). The EU budget after Lisbon: rigidity and reduced spending?. Journal of Public Policy, 33(3), 345-369.

Finke, D. & Fleig, A. (2013). The merits of adding complexity: non-separable preferences in spatial models of European Union politics. Journal of Theoretical Politics, 25(4), 546-575.

Garcia Pérez de León, C. (2011). Coalition Formation and Agenda Setting in EU Environmental Policy after the Enlargement. Les Cahiers Européens de Sciences Po., 5, 2-14.

Hagemann, S. & Høyland, B. (2010). Bicameral Politics in the European Union. Journal of Common Market Studies, 48(4), 811-833.


Hix, S. (2002). Constitutional Agenda-Setting Through Discretion and Rule Interpretation: Why the European Parliament Won at Amsterdam. British Journal of Political Science, 32(2), 259-280.

Jun, H.W. (2014). Supranational Agenda Setters in the European Union: Rapporteurs in the European Parliament. Korea Review of International Studies, ​17-33. ​

​
König, T. & Pöter, M. (2001). Examining the EU legislative Process: The Relative Importance of Agenda and Veto Power. European Union Politics, 2(3), 329-351.

Kovats, L. (2009). Do elections set the pace? A
quantitative assessment of the timing of European legislation. Journal of European Public Policy, 16(2), 239-255.     

Lord, C. (2013). The democratic legitimacy of codecision. Journal of European Public Policy, 20(7), 1056-1073.



Moser, P. (1996). The European parliament as conditional agenda setter: What are the conditions – a critique on Tsebelis. The American Political Science Review, 90(4), 834-838.

Pollack, M. (1997). Delegation, Agency, and Agenda Setting in the European Community. International Organization, 51(1), 99-134.


Skjærseth, J.B., Bang, G. & Schreurs, M. (2013).  Explaining Growing Climate Policy Differences Between the European Union and the United States. Global Environmental Politics, 13(4), 61-80.


Skodvin, T., Gullberg, A. T. & Aakre, S. (2010).  Target-group influence and political feasibility: the case of climate policy design in Europe. Journal of European Public Policy, 17(6), 854-873.


Tsebelis, G. (1994). The Power of the European Parliament as Conditional Agenda setter. American Political Science Review, 88(1), 128-142.

Tsebelis, G. (1995). Conditional agenda‐setting and decision‐making inside the European parliament. The Journal of Legislative Studies, 1(1), 65-93.



Tsebelis, G. (1996). More on the European Parliament as Conditional Agenda-setter: Response to Moser. American Political Science Review, 90(4), 839-844.


Tsebelis, G. & Garret, G. (1996). Agenda setting Power, Power Indices, and Decision Making in the European Union. International Review of Law and Economics, 16(3), 345-361.


Tsebelis, G. & Kreppel, A. (1998). The history of conditional agenda-setting in European institutions. European Journal of Political Research, 33(1), 41-71.


Tsebelis, G., Jensen, C., Kalandrakis, A. & Kreppel, A. (2001). Legislative Procedures in the European Union: an empirical analysis. British Journal of Political Science, 31(4), 573-599.

Tsebelis, G. & Proksch, S. (2007). The Art of Political Manipulation in the European Convention. Journal of Common Market Studies, 45(1), 157-186.

Varela, D. (2009). Just a Lobbyist?: The European Parliament and the consultation Procedure. European Union Politics, 10(1), 7-34.

Description

Argues that the proposal-making power associated with the EU presidency helps a  member state to obtain financial benefits during negotiations over the EU budget. Abstract

Looks at the agenda-setting power of the ECB president under the ECB's rotation model. Abstract



Examines the effects of the changes in the Lisbon Treaty on the power of the EP over the EU annual budget and multiannual financial framework. Abstract

Analyses the agenda-setting power of the European Commission in cases where actors’ spending preferences are conditional upon the expected policy outcome, but not vice versa. Abstract

Introduces a mixed model of coalitional bargaining and agenda setting (in the EP) to explain legislative decision making in the face of preference heterogeneity after the eastern enlargement. Abstract

Argues that the Council has conditional agenda-setting power due to a change in the majority thresholds for adopting legislation from the first to the second reading in the Parliament. Abstract

Argues that the empowerment of the European Parliament in the Amsterdam Treaty came about because the EP was a "constitutional agenda-setter" in the procedure leading up to the treaty change. Abstract

The paper examines the influence of agenda setters in the EP by focusing on the role of the rapporteur and finds that EP rapporteurs have constrained but substantial agenda-setting power in the role of 'conditional trustee'. Abstract
​
​On the power of the EP in the legislative process: comparative approach to different theoretical models of conditional agenda setting and vetoing. Abstract


Argues that the reallocation of agenda powers within the EP twice during a legislature better explains the timing of the adoption of bills than the end of Parliament’s term. Abstract

This article develops a framework for evaluating the legitimacy of codecision, showing how legislative agenda-setting, Council voting weights, EP elections and seat apportionments, and other factors all affect the legitimacy of codecision. Abstract

Critiques Tesbelis' perspective of the EP as an important "conditional agenda- setter and provides an alternative model to explain the partial influence of the EP. Abstract


Presents a theoretical framework to explain supranational influence on politics and to determine under which circumstances European institutions enjoy formal and informal agenda-setting power. Abstract

Argues that the agenda-setting privileges of  policy-makers, the dynamics of issue linkages, and legislative rules and procedures may account for the differences between EU and US climate change policies. Abstract


Argues that target groups’ capacity to influence the spectrum of politically feasible policy options tends to be higher when target groups control resources needed by decisionmakers that are agenda-setters and/or veto players in the decision-making process. Abstract

On the power of the conditional agenda setters, its potential to increase in the future and the positive effects on the pace of European integration. Abstract

Explains how the conditional agenda‐setting role of the EP is responsible for the adoption by the EU of the most advanced social regulation policies of the world and relaxes the restrictive assumption of the EP as an unitary actor. Abstract

Responds to an earlier article by Moser (see elsewhere in this bibliography) and tries to invalidate his critique on Tsebelis' prior model of conditional agenda setting, arguing that the policy-space is multi-dimensional and information is incomplete. Abstract             

Theoretical debate on two approaches to EU decision making: cooperative game theory and non-cooperative institutional analysis. The authors argue that the latter provides more insights into EU decision-making processes. Abstract

Develops an institutionalist theory of European Integration based on "conditional agenda- setting“, and argues that most participants in the integration process failed to grasp the implications of the EU's institutional structures. Abstract

Empirical comparative analysis of the conditional agenda-setting power of the EP under the co-operation procedure and its veto-power under the co-decision procedure. Abstract

Argues that the success of the European Convention in producing a Constitutional Treaty was possible because of the agenda control exercised by the Praesidium and in particular its President. Abstract

Develops a model of the EU consultation procedure, in which the EP gains legislative powers through the policy options provided by lobbyists. Abstract